“I think transparency
in central banking is kind of like truth-telling in everyday life. You got to be consistent about it. You can’t be opportunistic about it.”
He went on to clarify:
“I
think if you think about the recent developments and the information that we’ve
provided to the public about our thinking — I guess I would ask you to consider
the counterfactual, if we hadn’t said anything. The information we provided
about, for example, our contingent data-dependent plans for the asset purchase
program, we’re actually pretty close to our understanding of what markets
expected for that program. But suppose we had said nothing and that time had
passed and that market perceptions had drifted away from our own thinking and
our own expectations for policy. In addition, during that time, again in the
counterfactual where we don’t provide any information, it’s very likely that
more highly levered risk-taking positions might build up, reflecting, again,
some expectation of an infinite asset purchase program.”
Transparency is kinda like truth-telling. If you’re not really transparent, are we to
expect that the premium on the truth is kinda like your opacity? The ‘accommodative’ monetary policy that the
Fed continues to pursue is disguised under the argument that zero interest rate
environments and asset purchase manipulations at $85 billion a month will
stimulate employment and build momentum in the economy. In reality, Ben’s obsession has more to do
with cheap money to support wealth dislocation by enhanced leverage than it
does with unemployment. Cheap leverage
for private equity buy-outs and M&A do not stimulate employment. To the contrary, leveraged transactions
typically lead to consolidation efficiency and job cuts.
To justify his ‘optimistic’ view on the economy, Ben pointed
to housing – another asset bubble in the making courtesy of artificially low
interest rates – and debt-financed automobile purchases. The former is particularly fascinating given
the fact that the Fed is buying a lot of mortgage securitizations. The lower the interest rates, the lower the
terminal asset value of the mortgages that they’re buying. Now if they were a buy-and-hold investor,
this would be problematic. But they’re
not. They’re a buy-while-intervention-is-expedient
investor and they’ll be a dump-when-politically-expedient seller. In other words, the quality of the assets
they’re creating through the illusion of low interest and the 30 years that
those assets will be ‘underwater’ from a yield perspective doesn’t bother
them. But it should be highly troubling
to the public for two reasons.
First, manipulation of the mortgage securitization market is
a contributing factor to the 2008 recession.
Cheap money (then it was second mortgages being “cheaper” than consumer
credit) doesn’t create stable economic conditions. If buyers are only buying because credit is
cheap, then manufacturers are prone to establish a “normal” condition that’s
not resilient in economic shocks. This
problem has manifest several times in the past 15 years. But that’s the least of what should be worrisome. Far more problematic is the perfect storm
that the Fed’s policy has put in motion for pensioners and retirees over the
next 15 years. Let me explain.
Investments in liquid stocks have seen an apparent growth
over the past 5 years. With prices rising
from their 2008 lows and with leverage-fueled dividends, apparent asset value
has increased. This should be seen as
good news. However, lurking beneath the
surface of this ‘growth’ has been a leverage Charybdis waiting to yawn its
terrible mouth open to unleash a deadly whirlpool into which the populace can
fall. While profits rose on the
corporate down-sizing efficiencies and cheap leverage, top-line organic revenue
has not followed suit. Made worse by ‘accommodative’
monetary policies in other G-20 countries (something Ben also addressed
obliquely), exporters face highly volatile markets and are not growing new
business as quickly as their perceived ‘value’ has inflated. In other words, we didn’t get more workers
more productive over the past 5 years.
Rather we got fewer workers more efficient. Second, long-term assets (the fixed income kind)
have been depressed. From your CDs that
barely cover the postage to report on their meager performance to your 401(k)
fixed income accounts with PIMCO and Templeton, what was modeled to generate
2-3% has barely eked out half that value after fees (which haven’t changed
enough to compensate for the degradation in performance). And at the bottom of the yawning chasm – far beyond
the watchful gaze of most investors – insurance companies (life, mortgage, and
pension) have been holding onto loads of cash that has not kept up with the
mandatory returns that they need to fulfill their future obligations.
This last point is the one that could really take out the
next generation. What made the first
hundred years of the Federal Reserve work was its inextricable accommodation to
match asset duration between the banking and life insurance and (insured)
mortgage sector. Take away life and
property insurance and you don’t have the U.S. real estate market. Take away these markets and you don’t have
long-term investments. And have
insurance companies fail to keep up with their actuarial investment
requirements and you don’t have liquid insurers in a decade or so. Conspicuously missing from the Chairman’s
comments were any references to the Pujo Committee and its investigations
leading up the authorization of the Fed.
What was supposed to be a mechanism to break the banking monopoly on
financial and monetary policy in 1912 actually turned into a mechanism which
now is entirely an asset monopolist on both the U.S. Treasury and the mortgage
market fronts. And worst of all, this
particular monopolist is actually undermining the future in triplicate.
Preservation of the current interest rate environment has
not worked nor will it in the indeterminate future. In fact, the longer it persists, the bigger the
implosion. This ‘bubble’ won’t pop –
instead it is a giant vacuum that will suck future economic interests into a
downward spiral. We’ll have to make up
new names – not Recession and Depression but Coriolis and Charybdis. And, to be clear, the present course has been
set for so long that we’ll necessarily have to pay to unwind it. And that, unlike Ben’s speech, is not
conditional, situational truth. It’s the
cold, hard facts. At the undoing of QE3,
equities will fall, insurers will default, and real estate will collapse
again. And we’ll keep sharing this fate
until we embrace an economy that fosters productivity-based policies rather
than monetary manipulative accommodation.