Let's face it. For the
past 65 years, what has been heralded as entrepreneurship has largely been a
concession that raw capitalism does not work without the barely hidden hand of
the State. From its birth in America
during the second half of WWII, anti-competitive incentives were deemed
necessary to induce scientists, engineers and industrialists to overcome the
technological superiority of the Third Reich.
Through the cunning use of excessive profits in military and government
procurement (without which the American entrepreneurial milieu would have been
still-born), to protectionist concessions to ultra-wealthy investors, to modern
revenue shifting and tax base erosion, the world became entranced by the
formulaic illusion we marketed under the monikers of Silicon Valley, Research
Triangle, Boston, and the like.
The ingredients of that illusion included a variety of
schemes including: isolation of ideas behind the protectionist walls we
politely call intellectual property; underwriting credit market ignorance with
public funds; and, persistently holding 'capital-access summits' in hopes that
through sufficient convening, we could overcome our fundamental incapacity
towards capital markets adaptation. But
the problem with our incapacity to understand the economics of an innovation-fueled
economy has its roots not in Silicon Valley but rather in the manipulations a
century ago - the illusion provided by socialized infrastructure and property
finance. There would be no Stanford but
for the socialized rail inducements demanded by its namesake from Congress when
he concluded that building a railroad across the mountains was difficult. And by the way, if you think out-sourcing of
labor to China is a modern phenomenon, think again. Much of the dynamite that blasted rail
fortunes into the pockets of California industrialists and financiers was laid
by, you guessed it, underpaid Chinese.
Laying track was never profitable.
Forcing Congress to grant land and money for each linear foot and degree
of grade was. Thirty year mortgages and
thirty year Treasuries are not randomly equal in their duration. Take a look at the Fed's balance sheet and
ask yourself why it's not filled with market assets. It's because both Treasuries and mortgages on
their own didn't work. With government
subsidy, they create the illusion of working… until they don't.
I've been interested in the resurgence of international
efforts to use sovereign balance sheets (citizens' monies) to subsidize banks
in an attempt to get capital flowing to entrepreneurial ventures. From the U.S. Small Business Administration
to the state banks in China, this idea has been frequently attempted and, to
date, has not succeeded. And the reasons
for the systemic failure are quite simple.
1. The State as
underwriter cannot indict its own asset origination. Whether its negligence on the part of
sanctioned credit rating agencies lying about mortgage quality to patent
offices issuing fraudulent patents, no state agency to date has evidenced the
ability to impose qualitative critique on its own promulgation of 'assets' and
therefore has no capacity to measure asset risk. If one wishes to see innovative small
business grow, one has to first insure that innovative isn't a façade for
"ignorant of the activities of others."
2. Most
businesses aren't. The recent
proliferation of low- to no-revenue acquisition transactions does not vindicate
the notion that a business exists because someone bought it. If you closely examine the frequently hyped
corporate acquisitions, it takes no time to realize that the acquiring
companies are providing liquidity for their venture firm benefactors seeking
exits - not purchasing accretive assets.
In the end, the common equity shareholder is losing for the excessive
gains flowing to the venture partners.
If a market or a country doesn't have this nepotism, it cannot build
free market entrepreneurship. And I'm
not suggesting that this be done to reinforce the illusion.
3. It's
customer - not capital - access that's the real problem. Since the formation of the WTO, the world was
supposedly aspiring to the reduction of obstacles to trade. And it's fair to say that in internet and
telecom enabled businesses, this aspiration has been partially achieved. But for the majority of business,
multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements have been overweight in their
favoritism to certain industries while leaving the majority of industry in the
cold. Governments who really want to
support entrepreneurship should aspire to being premium customers - not bad
underwriting surrogates.
Building a system equivalent to the past 30 years of
American entrepreneurial socialism may present a political expediency to
short-sighted governments. But any
careful examination will conclude that alternatives may be worth considering. In a functioning system - operating without
State subsidy and taxpayer money - one might observe:
1. Rights need
to be granted for trade use, not for speculation and imagination. The world receives no benefit for granting
proprietary rights to someone who does not practice or intend to practice their
innovative ideas in actual output.
Restraint of hypothetical markets or research with hypothetical claims
of invention are actually ludicrous.
2. Connecting
innovation to existing impulses with existing production, sales, distribution,
and infrastructure is far more accretive than forming redundant companies with
redundant capabilities. This means that
the focus of the public sector is on facilitating communication - not mandating
public policy through the pocket of the Treasury.
3. It's still
all about the customer. In a
non-interventionist functioning capitalist marketplace, the consumer affirms
the value attributed by the producer or servicer rather than having the
producer dictate a state-sanctioned monopoly mandated premium. In short, if the consumer, participant or community
seeks to partake in a mediated experience, than the same community attributes
the premium they are willing to exchange for what they receive. Regression to commodity pricing is the
perverse extension of market mean reversion which is a legacy of Adam Smith -
not a necessity of markets.
When the public sector underwrites any sector - banking,
suppliers or the like - with the public treasury, it must do so with the
explicit objective of merely overcoming a short term market failure. Persistence in such undertakings over an
extended period of time should be called what it is: state intermediated
socialism for targeted benefit. Since
the GFC, the public has born the expense of this type of intervention without
receiving the public good associated therewith.
If we're going to aspire to market interactions, let's call a spade a
spade and stop misleading the public with policies that inure to their
detriment.